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The_ Research Question .
The study of business organizations relative to
their successes and failures has becoms a significant
pastime for businessmen, and provided considerable incon
for some micro-eco Lsts, academicians and magazine
writers. Empirical knowledge has been the foundation of
business theory and filled in where there has been no
theory.
Emulation of successful, organizations by those that
are seeking the light of truth is being practiced constantly.
General Motors ' decentralized success under Alfred P. Sloane
was imitated by many in an effort to achieve financial gain.
Unfortunately, in borrowing methods from another organization,
all attending conditions must be considered in order to be
reasonably sure of similar results. All too often this was
not done by General Motors admirers who discovered that
decentralization was not the Midas touch.
Likewise, the purpose of this thesis is not to show
exactly why a large corporation is successful, but to possibly
shed some light on what is widely recognized to be the most
valuable resource of that corporation, its management.

The International Business Machines Corporation
(hereafter referred to as IBM) is often reputed to be
one of the most successful modern corporations in V
United States and the world. Ev:' e of this success
will be explored in Chapter II. For now, it should be
sufficient to know that it is an organization of rapid
and con owth, now controlling some 70 to 80
percent of the world data processing equipment market.
Naturally, there are many IBM watchers, both
professional and amateur who have varying opinions as to
the key(s) to IBM's noteworthy record. Some of the
reasons often stated are: computer hardware reliability',
devotion to research in many areas; superior programming
and software technologies; concentration on and perfection
of salesmanship; seemingly unlimited customer support;
superior manufacturing capabilities; maintenance of a
high quality corporate image; selective hiring and promotion
techniques; lots of cash and sufficient size to absorb the
consequences of mistakes.
All of the foregoing seem to be legitimate contribu-
tions to the IBM success story to a limited extent; however,
there is one more factor that is almost universally pro-
claimed and is more pervasive than those mentioned:
superlative management. IBM's management practices are
noted as among the most successful in modern industry.

These practices a \ not written in IBM doctrine since
they are executed as dictated by the situation. We
cannot, then, e; Cl se practices, but we can gain
some insight into the people who generate the decision
and see that they are executed.
It may be said that IBM's management practices
arc- a function of its executives or ma' :s . Management,
after all, cannot stand alone without formulation, inter-
pretation and execution by executives. The main research
question of this thesis, then, is to pinpoint the charac-
teristics possessed by IBM top management personnel that
may contribute to IBM's extraordinary record, current
status and future prospects. In examining this area, we
should be able to an" hilarities or differences
within the top management group, and also characteristics
of that group that may either set it apart from other
corporate managements or associate it with successful
organiza t ions
.
Before this main question can be analyzed properly,
however, other more basic questions must be researched:
Has IBM really been successful and what constitutes that
success? How is IBM organized? What are the key areas
of that organization and who are the top managers? Are
there any noteworthy characteristics peculiar to top IBM
managers that are either similar to or different from othc

4successful industrial organisations? Where has 3
succeeded that other similar corporation;- h ve
not? How will IBM top m ;nt react to changing
social attitudes of the future?
It is expected that .the answers to these questio
will display IBM's management proficiency in its
fundamental element; the people who ma3 the corporation
work the way it does, This is an effort to characterize
IBM top level managers in terras of who they are and where
they come from as applied to what they do and why they
do it.
Sco ' ' '•in of the Study
In order to gain an adequate understanding of I]
management and attach the proper significance to the
examination of that management, it is necessary that
this thesis take on the structure of a case study. The
first premise that must be established is that IBM is
indeed successful and significantly so. This is done in
several ways.
IBM's current standing among major U.S. industrial
corporations is shown along with historical trends and
future projections. Also, an. examintion will be made of
trends of various indicators, such as earnings in several
forms. These are particularly interesting when related to
stockmarket >. itations and stock performance.

i'io. -a i. ] '- ''<:.'.._ _ •
'
'
.;!]. 1. i • 3s bet
and similar corporations such as Polaroid, Xerox,
Control Data Corporation and the Univac Diva n of
Sperry Rand. In this way, parallels and dive ::es
can be •-.".. to lend insight into rn cteris-
tics exhibited in the same or similar markets.
The last phase of IBM's success is often se
as the biggest limiting factor, and should th« re
be examined : legal confrontation. Lawsuits hav
provided soma of the stormiest episodes in IBM's history
and will probably continue to do so. The very n.
I
of its size, growth rate and market dominance have
made IBM vulnerable to this avenue of attack. Many IBM
watchers see legal action as the only significant
inhibitor to continuing growth and dominance.
To be fully appreciative of IBM as a commercial
insitution it is necessary to understand its history.
IBM is built to a greater extent than most corporations
on tradition pro dominant personalities. An understanding
of these traditions and personal influences is vital to
corporate behavior, even now in a dynamic business
environment.
To this end we will examine the formation of IBM
by its noteworthy organizer and driver, Thomas J. Watson.
The patterns of growth from the meager early 1900 's to

Che present colossus will be explored. And finally, we
will become acquainted with the IBM corporate beliefs
and goals as outlined by Thomas J. Watson, Jr., inheritor
of the IBM family legacy and Chairman of the Boa:.'-.
These philosophJ.es are sometimes discounted as havi:
less meaning in today's business than they once did, but
are essential to the appreciation of the IBM way of life
and aura of success.
Next, it is necessary to look at the present IBM
corporate organization. The organization itself and
the rationale behind that organization is described, as
well as trends in that organization. The most appare
reason for outlining the IBM organization is to ascertain
key organization positions within it. The men filling
these positions are those that will be analyzed in the
following chapter.
Designation of top management is the first
necessary step to analysis of IBM managers . Basically,
they are; the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Board,
President, Executive Committee Chairman, all Senior Vice
Presidents, all Vice Presidents, all Group Executives,
all Division Senior Executives or Presidents, the Secretary,
the Treasurer, and the Controller. Other members of the
Board of Directors are excluded because they are recruited
from other institutions and may not necessarily reflect

IBM man. Lopment and philosophy.
Bio hical information on these ii duals 1:
analyzed relative to the IBM Executive group and to other-
leading industrial corporations. The info:. tion extracted
is: age, formal education^ occupational background,
tenure with IBM, promotion pattern and other less tangible
overall group characteristics. Tabulation and comparison
of this information is used to show how IBM manage '' :'
different from some other successful organizations, and
how it is to a great extent: internally homogeneous.
Exploration of historical or present traits is of
little value unless projected into the future. The last
area of research is therefore involved with how IBM will
react to future situations. Answers to several questions
will be attempted: Will the current emphasis on markets
continue to be as all-pervasive? Will the technological
explosion change management pat 3 or the principle
sources of top management personnel? How will IBM
respond to the increasingly important role of social
responsibility? Will IBM top management recruiting and
promotion practices be affected by such social attitudes
as anti-establishment sentiments, trend of college graduates
away from business careers, and increased employee mobility?
It is assumed that these are questions for which IBM
itself may not yet have the answers; yet they are germane

8to its future status and worthy of s Nation. IBM
trades to a great extent on its image as an icon of the
i.) lustrial community, and as such will probably continue
in attempts to embellish that image. In trying to answer
the above questions, further insight into the IBM corporate
management character is developed.
Res
e
arch and Analysis Method s
.
The research methods used were of three basic
types : library reading, interview, and correspondence
inquiries. Correspondence inquiries were addressed to
IBM corporate offices. One interview was conducted with
a local IBM information representative. Other conversa-
tions have been conducted with various IBM customers and
employees prior to formal commencement of the thesis
research effort.
Current periodicals were the source of the chapter-
related to IBM success. The variety of sources is viewed
as being objective testimony to success patterns. Three
books furnished background information for both the
historical chapter and the chapter on IBM success.
Material on IBM organization was obtained through
an interview with a local IBM information office and recent
IBM Annual Reports to Stockholders. Biographical material
on top management personnel was obtained through correspondence

with IBM corporate headqu and various busi ss
inquiries
.
Information and opii on the future of IBM was
also obtained through correspondence with corp<
headquarters, v: ; iodicals and books, along with
a certain amount of personal speculation,, The value of
these ju \ in enhanced through personal exposure to
IBM employees, IBM ex-employees, IBM customers, and
customers of other competing corporations.
One other book, Top Manaj nt * is particularly
helpful in comparing IBM top management characteristics
to those of fifteen other leading U.S. industrial
corporations. The various biographical qualities pre-
viously mentioned are tabulated for the 43 IBM executives
selected and percentages extracted. These percentages
are then compared to those of the fifteen surveyed
corporations for similarities and differences.
It is realized that analysis based solely upon
information from IBM is of necessity not always objective.
It is felt, however, that the diversity of articles and
books, in addition to personal experience, provide the
objectivity required. At times the comments contained in
Ipaul £. Holden, Carlton A. Pederson, Gayton E.
Germane. Too Management
.
(New York; McGraw-Hill Book
Co. , Inc. , 1967)7
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this thesis may appear to be slanted toward IBM, but this
is because IBM's progress ban in fact been most excepl
And it is because of its exceptional long terra record that
IBM is selected as the object of this research.

II. 3 I SUCCESS
Curr ent Standing
.
Gilbei ch and the Editors cf For have
stated
:
"IBM's mo\ it to c titive strength is not
yet equalled in industry. "*-
"No capital goods industry has grown so fast
[as the computer industryJ, No cap:'. Lai goods industry
has been so c, ited by a single company
[ j
"2
A recent issue of Business Week says
:
Few if any companies domin Lc their
major markets the way International Business
Machines Corporation does ... a company so




Such comments are strong testimony regarding
IBM's present position in the marketplace. It is not
possible to quote the precise share of the market
controlled by IBM because there is no agreement on a
percentage figure. IBM competitors and the Department
^-Gilbert Burck (and the editors of Fortune). The
Computer and its Potential for Management
.
(New York:
flar pe r a nd Row ] 196 5), p . 67.
^Gilbert Burck. "The Computer Industry's Great
Expectations," Fortune
,
August, 1968, p. 92.
3»When Products Fail IBM's Tough Test," Business




of Justice estimate around 80 parcel: IBM will admit
to something short of 70 p nt. Fortune claims I
1
control to be 70 percent and stable. 1-
Some comment about the market in which IBM cc
is in order. It can be cat ized into bar."
(computers) and software (programs and systems). The
i oftware market is worth nearly $2 billion an tually.
Roughly three-fourths of it is controlled by hardware
manufacturers, and three-fourths of that is controlled
by IBM. 2
The hardware market is expanding at a rate of
about twenty percent per year, and now totals about $1.4
billion per year. It is expected to reach about $30
billion by 1972, and IBM is expected to maintain its 70
percent plus share.
-
It is foreseen that the computer or information
sciences industry will continue to expand significantly
as has been the case since it began in the early 1950 ' s
„
The reason is that the technology feeds on itself,
expanding man's creativity and ability to learn. Tew
technologies are devised and new information justifies
new pursuits. In the business world, automatic data
1-Burck. "Great Expectations," p. 92.
2 Burck
,
The Computer and its Potential for
Management, p. 137.
^Burck. "Great Expectations," p. 145.
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p: i ing has bee] sold m to fu ii; h informatic
and better manage : techniques than to streamli
hods. In a more material aspect, compute-
are just now able to learn by exp
heuristic programming. Goi - Lso being l s
to design other computers --the beginnings of a sort of
ban] cal p ] ;
Wei ! s involvement with automation is now
nearly 1- able. Return to al methods in tb
business world is all but vv\i:]i' : ' ble. Most scienti:^
achieve] to date would be st- not nullified.
Perhaps a more meaningful indication of IBM's
stature in the industrial community is its position
relative to o leading industrial corporations in
recent past years, i . ' 1 rankings according to
For' p o '-de possibly th >st substantial pictu
of IBM's comparative progress over recent years . *-
In the area of gross sales, IBM has risen from
eighteenth place in 1963 to tenth place in 1955, then to
seventh place in 1957 and finally to sixth place in 1968.
During that period IBM has jumped ahead of V.'es t ing3 Louse,
Bethlehem Steel, Mobil Oil, DuPont, Texaco, and U.S.
l f,The Top 500 (Industrial Corporations). Fortune ,
May 15, 1959, pp. 121-5.




In not income, IBM has overtaken Ford Motor
Co., Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of California, Texaco
and DuFont, in progressing from ninth place in V
to third place in 1968.
*
Other Fortune statistics show that IBM ranks
number five in numb : of employees in 1968, numb:
seven in total assets, and number six in investment
capital. IBM has advanced from t -second to
nineteenth in net income as a percent of sales, and
from sixty-sixth to thirty-seventh in net i ; as a
percent of investment capital
t
between 1957 and 1968,
IBM's growth rate was forty-fifth among the
top five hundred industrials in 1968. Although IBM's
growth is noteworthy it probably ranks no higher than
this because of its already considerable base against
which growth rate is measured.
The total market value of IBM common stock is
the highest of all industrials and its price per share
is the highest on the New York Exchange. In the ten-
year period from 1959 through 1968, IBM stock splits have
totalled 280 percent. This information is relatively
unimportant except as a gauge of investor's expectations
1,, Here Comes IBM," Forbes, March 1, 1968, p. 48;
and "The Top 500," Fortune, May 15, 1969, pp. 121-5.

with regard to future IBM market potential and earning
power. informatio es more sign: ficant when
viewed in conjunction with Exhibit I.
Althougl i p. i ce-e arni ngs ratio for I3M common
stock has been so high as to give som ' /- t watchers
cause to think the price will someday tumble of its
own Lght,*- ' : : 1 shows that this indicator has
so far been ignored by investors, probably due to
steady and impressive growth in earnings, shareholders,
and expectations of future earnings potential.
Comparison Org-niaatio-.
When examining a corporation it is often useful
to obtain some kn( of other organizations of the
same type. In order to achieve a well rounded compara-
tive picture, two corporations of similar character will
be discussed, both of high marketing and technological
competence, but not necessarily competing in the same
market: Polaroid and Xerox. Next, two other corporations
will be examined which are the strongest competitors with
IBri in the data processing world: Control Data Corporation
^•Moody's Handbook o f Common Stocks, Third Quarter
1969, p. 502; "and IBM Annual Report , 1968, pp. 56-8.
^Earnings per share in 1969 were $8,21 with the
market price of common stock near $350 par share.
o^i . • • eket price per share fs350 __ /, o s i-^ i )Price-earnings ratio = r ^—, . I i Q -a\ = 4-Z.3 to 1/earnings per share \So.Zl /
Priced-earnings ratios for the Fortune Top 500 companies
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and the Univac Division of Sperry Rand.
A. POLAROID.
Along with IBM and . . , Polaroid is known as
03 i of the leading growth stocks."" Further, Polaroid
ranks twenty-first among industrial corporations in
total stock market value, but only 344th in sales.
This seeming paradox is attributable to the theory
that the stock price is based on faith in Polaroid's
marketing, technology and public image in the form of
, . 9
anticipatfeQ earnings/ This is apparently the r
type of faith investors show in IBM,
There are also other similarities. Polaroid :'
mostly the product of one man's personality: Edwin H,
Land, founder, President, Chairman of the Board, and
inventor of the self -process ing camera. His close
associations with Harvard and MIT have given him valuable
technological allies and a wealth of status.
Technology and patents play a large role in
Polaroid, as they do in IBM; however, in both organize
tions, technology generally proceeds more rapidly than
patent life expiration, Polaroid is continuously
1Adam Smith, The Money Game. (New York: Dell








^"Polaroid. " Forbes , June 15, 1959, p. 42.
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developing neW techniques to ahead of would-be
competitors. One of Land's objectives is to make only
products or features which other companies are not
willing or able to produce.
Polaroid views its camera, marketing effort as
mostly a prerequisite to film sales. That is, the mere
cameras that are in the public's hands, the more film
will be sold. One of Polaroid's major advantages ove:
larch of the industry, is that Kodak sa 3 a
consent decree in 1954 in answer to restraint of trade
allegations prohibiting marketing of film processing
as a part of the price of the. film; in Polaroid's case,
such separation is not possible.
Marketing is as Important to Polaroid as it is
to IBM. In fact, Polaroid's success is more widely
attributed to marketing than to technology. Markets
are carefully picked. Television and magazine exposure
recently aimed at the youth market is now stimulating
camera and film sales in supermarkets. Attempts are
being made to develop increasingly smaller cameras so
that nearly anyone can carry one as a convenience item.
There will then truly be a mass market for Polaroid film,
Edwin Land started as a technician, but now has
become a very competent management executive. His
management policies are interesting and in many ways

19
different from those at IBM. He does not believe in
scientific manag it, di not write ] 10s, and
does not have a coi nization chart. Land does,
however, take co i " ble interest in his employees,
frequently telling them informally what Polaroid is
doing and where it a Lng. In this effort to preserve
the small company at. re, he is folli .' tg Che sa ;
goals held by IBM. On the financial side, Land is
somewhat of a uniaj r, He sees no point in
acquisition of oth< ipanies and di- " iication,
though Polaroid stock value would make such a strategy
easy. He also refuses to finance^ operations through
lon;~ term debt. All production increases to keep up
with marketing plans are financed through increased
stock sales. The theory is that the stock base is
large enough and prospscts are good enough so that
earnings per share aren't significantly diluted.
The above comparisons between Polaroid and IBM
are useful in understanding the philosophies of expanding,
successful corporations . Polaroid is currently pointing
towards slides and movies, which may pave the road to
overtaking Kodak. It is possible that Polaroid may even
become a participant in IBM's market through, the photo-
graphic recordii or production of data. The main similarity
in philosophy between the two is their emphasis on marketing.
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B, XE : .;
roj i s d Li £usj 3 b e as a c ip i growth
resembles that of 3 .., but which is not an IBM d titor
in the data processing market. In reality, Xerox recently
control of successful Scientific Data Systems and
is now in IBM's territory under the new name of Xerox Data
Systi is (XDS).l
cled in 1905 under the nai Eialloid
Co. which produced photographic papers. Today X«
compet ss with many companies in the copying business, but
protects its techni< of copying on ordinary paper with
some 500 patents. Since I960,- Xerox sales have increased
18 times, profits 37 times and market value of common stocl
50 times. Profits have grown at a rate of twenty per cent
for s ix co n s e c 1 1 1 ive ye ars
,
Again, Xerox places greatest emphasis on marketing
with a 7,800-man national sales force. The technology and
application of copying has evolved into business systems,
with salesmen acting as business consultants in the same
way computers are marketed. Xerox national growth rate of
fifteen percent per year is exceeded only by its expansion
abroad. Its international nature is very similar to that
1
"portrait of XD3 After its First Day in Business",
Bus ine s s Week , December 20, 1959, p. 90.




Like many computer : "actuj rs , Xerox rents its
machines with an additional u: ige i \ sr copy. This type
of marketing provides deferred, but steady cash flows into
the company enabling it to* expand under stable f inane*
planning.
Xerox has capitalized on scientific development
to form a sound technological base. Its men nt's
visionary attitudes on exp iing business m fcs have
made it very similar to 1] The company has shown high
profits and investors have reflected the same high
expectations. As XDS it may soon be competing with IBM
in the area of information systems.
C. UNIVAC
The Univac Division of Sperry Rand has perhaps
the longest experience in the computer field of any major
company. It was in 1950 after IBM had chosen not to buy
the. first electronic compute:: developed by J. Presper
Eckert and Dr. sJohn W. Mauchly that Univac acquired the
Eckert-Mauchley Corporation and their Eniac. In the
following year the first UNIVAC I was produced.
From that time on Univac became a household word
i Thomas Belden and Marva Be Id en. The Lengtheni
Shadow
.




resulting from its role in tabulating and forecasting
election returns. Unfortunately for Univac, its
management was neither cohesive nor perceptive enou;
to capitalize on the newfound image. Univac' s share of
the computer market was one hundred percent in 1952 and
dropped sharply thereafter.
U , iivac from from the outset a technologically
oriented organization. Senior management seemed to
lack the vision to see how commercial business would
develop.
Univac President, Robert E. McDonald has said,
We developed some outstanding mr.ch.ines
in the large-scale and real-time area, but
we never mounted the marketing organization
to sell them.
. .
We always underestii ited
the power of the computer. We couldn't
visualise its influence. 3-
There were also open management conflicts in
the 03 Lzation. When design faults were found in
the UNIVAC 1 there was much shifting of blame and
accusation. Amidst the furor, several of Univac*
s
best people resigned, among them William Morris, now
Chairman and President of the formidable Control Data
Corporation. It is obvious there were no clear lines
of authority. Management visibility was fuzzy and
problems were difficult to pin down.
1
"Univac Comes In From the Cold," Business '
November 22, 1969, pp. 161-3.
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"3y today's standards, Univac's first L5 years
\ - almost complely unplanned.", McDonald says. 1
Until recently, Un i.vac ! s orga ni z a t i o n n tay be
characterised by absence of goals, underestimation of
the product, lack of planning and organization, man
ment bickering, and lack of salesmanship and m rketing
emphasis
.
Gilbert Burck has said, "Few enterprises ha
ever turned out so excellent a product and m
so 3 neptJ y, ••
.lore recently, however, Univac has recovered to
some extent u] - the guidance of. Dr. Louis Rader who
moved from International Telephone and Telegraph, a
who has since left Univac for General Electric. In 1963
Univac increased its dollar volume of installed computers
by 23 percent. Its sale of the Air Force base inventory
control system for $50 million was a milestone. Massive
writeoffs of obsolete equipment have at least been
partially compensated for by a constant lease-to-sale
ratio providing steady cash flows.
^
x Ibid.
2 3urck . The
_




"Company Reviews --The Big Eight Companies."
Moody's Computer industry Survey, Fall, 1968, pp. 281-2.
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Univac now seems to be snapping out of its long-
term slump through expert, ma -oriented planna
coupled with its still formidable tec] tise.
Univac has shown profits during the past three years for
the first time since many can i ber. Emphasis tow;
large multi-processing computers having communications
capabilities is evidence that Univac man: ;t is ' g
the perceptiveness of technological application to future
i kets so necessary to such a dynamic industry.
Univac 's progression or regression since 1950
has been almost opposite to that of IE [. Successes in
the marketplace have been sparce for Univac and abunds
for IBM because of organization, planning, marketing,
and above all, management. re IBM has been firmly
dedicated to these four areas, Univac has shown neglect.
The results are startlingly apparent.
D. CONTROL DATA CORPORATION (CDC)
In 1956, the Univac dropouts, headed by William
Morris formed the most notable new computer corporation.
It is now coming close to overtaking Univac as the second
largest manufacturer of computers, next to IBM, Its
revenue from sales, rentals and services blossomed to
$438 million in 1968. l Only CDC, Univac and IBM are
1 "Control Data Tackles the Giant," Business Week ,
June 28, 1969, p. 148.
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currently « i tg profits in the data process!] , m n st.
Its profits are second only to IBM in t] :: ustry. 1
CDC has made this progress by co in the
market where the dominant IBM is weakest, large-scale
scientific machines. Lately, however, CDC has been
expanding into an entire product line and looking more
and more like IBM.
2
Most of CDC's business has been in r< itals so
that much income is deferred. Because big chunks of
capital are required for e: : ion, CDC has acquired
control of the Commercial Credit Company end actively
sought more business tl / > outj i ' t sales.
One of Kerr is 1 objectives through expansion is
to achieve a large enough financial base to house IBM-
type risks. Previous marketing targets have been.
government and universities, but now business applica-
tions are beginning to require systems as large as
scientific work so that CDC is in a position to penetrate
the commercial market to a significant extent.
T. A. Wise, "Control Data's Newest Cliffhanger,
"
Fortune , February, 1968, p. 126.
^"Control Data Digs its Goldmine," Business keek,
September 28, 1969, p. 59.




Along with greater manufacturing facilities
1 Lng built to accommodate this expansion, a greater
marketing force is being developed. CDC's advancements
in technological design of large computers is seen to
be two years ahead of IBM;*ho ir, Norris sees the
need to ove . the IBM reputation. The answers is
apparently tetter equipment and customer support.-
As with I 1 ' l. and Polaroid, CDC is largely tD
manifestation of key personalities. Seymour R, Gray '
is among the leading computer developers in the world.
It is his influence that is chiefly responsible for CDC's
o
technical excellence.
The most do ' '': personality is that of Willis
Norris, who is said to be tough, s id, autocratic
and a careful handler of money. His goal is to be the
"Ford" of the computer industry, conceding don ' ; ee
to IBM. His leadership has boosted company morale to
an exceptional level through a venturesome spirit.
Norris has fathered a taut, fast-moving, enthusiastic
and fluid organization. J In fact, it is Morris who is
P. 127.
J-iv'ise, "Control Data's Newest Cliffhanger, " p. 177.
2 "'Control Data Tackles the Giant," p. 148.
3,/ise "Control Data's Dewest Cliffhanger, .'"
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almost singularly ir.spi: ' , current legal action
against IBM in which has all tl :s of a lasting
confrontation.
At the present time GDC appears to be IBM's roos
t
serious competitor and a dynamic force in the computer
market, its characteristics are very similar to IBM's.
C3C is agressiva and building a sizable mark ting for<
The quality of its equipment is well established. Most
important, its management is p »rc i has clear
goals on where the future lies. This feeling is passed
throughout the organization so that employees are
convinced they a: teml s of a winning organization.
Legal Confa
Lawsuits have provided some of the largest
stumbling blocks in IBM's road to success. Yet these
confrontations have played a large part in molding the
IBM character, and have in man)- ways clarified corporate
goals and strengthened the resolve of the organization
to survive and excel in the fact of government threats.
To some extent, IBM's reputation for fair dealing and
quality marketing was spanned through federal government
legal action.
The pattern started to form in the early 1900 's
before IBM, when Thomas Watson, a sales manager for the
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>nal Casl ' er Qo (KCR), T-'7 a- 3 Pl< in char
of dealing with competing comp ties. Watson vigorously
pu su 5 hi ', competiti .' tl used machi by
secretly "inducing" by various : ; many of Che small
used cash register dealers* to sell out to his dummy
company.
One prominent tactic used a:, ' t new machine
competitors was to make a machine that looked like tl
competitive model and sell it for less tin the competi-
tor's machine, or build in features causing it to fail
prematurely, leaving the impression that co stil :'s
cash registers were t .'.or, • These were call
"knockout machines," peddled by "knockout squads" or
"knockers".
In 1912, Watson and several other NCR executives
were indicted on three counts of criminal conspiracy in
restraint of trade and maintaining a monoply. Early in
the following year they were convicted and sentenced,
Watson was tagged for five years, but because of appeals,
later good deeds and the omnipresent passage of time,
the case merely died cut and the sentence was never served.




and Day, 1969), pp. 44-5.
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Watson, for: one of his most often spoken adi
throughout hi:' days at IBM was "Do right.'".
By 1935 IE .' ily established, and together
with Re lington Rand, produced virtually all car::1 pro-
cessing equipment in use, * The U.S. r cnment was at
that: time tl 3 ,est user and was desirous of produci
and printing blank punch cards itself in order to save
money. Unfortunately, IB^'fi policy at the time \
that no one else's cards but IBM's were of suffice
quality to guars adequate machine performance.
Furthermore, ] M and Univac had entered into an agreement
whereby one c< ny would net attempt to n rl ;t its
products .to firms where the other was exclusively
employed
.
The government saw that such actions were in
restraint of trade. In 1936, IBM was convicted of
restraint of trade, but Mr, Watson always contended





Again, in 1955 the federal government had mis-
givings about IBM's size and dominant capabilities,
This time if was out to dissolve IBM's policy of making
its machines available through lease only. Also, IBM
* Ibid
. , p. 130.
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had patent rights on a high speed press that was able
to produce cards faster anc re economically than
an/one else:, to the extent that IE ;ain virtually
monopolized all card sales. *•
In 1956, over vehement protesting by the agin
Chairman, Thomas Watson, Torn Watson, Jr., then corporate
President, signed a consent decree, pa" ing the way for
outright sales of eOiUipment and agree t by IBM to
divest itself of card producing c bility down to
fifty percent of the to1 vailable in the industry.
IBM was fo ; an image as a vigorous competitor ^ but
on3 which was eager to play by the rules.
And now IBM is once again embroiled in legal
hassles, only this time the adversary has several heads.
The Data Processing and Financial Corporation, largely
a marketer of data processing services, has charged
that IBM's packaging of programs with computers un<^ c
the same price structure is discriminatory, in that IBM
customers receive preferential treatment. e-
The young and prosperous Control Data Corporation






''Another Great Divide", Forbes, February 1, 1969,

3L
marketing of "phantom computers." That is, accord:'-
to CDC, when CDC was preparing to announce their giant
model 6600 in 1965, IBM announcer] their System 350,
model 91 and persuaded many would-be CDC customers
to hold their orders to see if the IBM machine couldn't
do the job better. Whan the 360/91 failed to materialize
primarily because of programming and systems (software)
delays, CDC President, William Norris challenged IBM's
intent. •*
More recently, CDC announced its latest super-
computer, the 7600 and some think that CDC's legal
assault is an effort to temporarily forestall IBM
announcement of a competing computer and, therefore,
gain a market advantage. '• Whatever the rationale, it
is a formidable legal effort because of IBM's vulnerable
position as the dominant figure in the market.
There are also lesser lawsuits being brought
against IBM. Typical of these is young Joan Van Horn's
accusation that IBM gives preferential equipment prices
to its wholly-owned subsidiary, Service Bureau Corpora-
tion, in order to give it an advantage in the computer
time-sharing and real-time markets.
J- "IBM and the Feds Make Three," Moody's Computer
Industry Survey, Winter, 1968-9, p. 191.
2.,Another Great Divide", p. 17.
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Finally, the Justice Department, on the last
working day of the Johnson Administration filed suit
against IBM for being so large and dominant as to be
monopolistic. The main goal of this suit is divesti-
ture by IBM of its various, divisions and perhaps
restriction from certain markets such as time-sharing
and real-time.
IBM has declared that it will fight all of these
suits vigorously, and of course, contends that: they
are ill founded. Since 1955, IBM has contented the
Justice Department with the consent decree of that
year. But since 70-75 percent market control is
commonly acknowledged to be justification for anti-
trust actions, IBM has been on thin ice.
The most convincing argument put forth by IBM
is that its development and expansion almost single-
handedly spawned the data processing industry as we
know it today, and that new companies are continuously
starting and flourishing. Many other companies in the
industry agree with this. Also, IBM's careful observance
of nondiscriminatory pricing and disdain for price
cutting have constructed a price umbrella, allowing
other firms to keep their prices relatively high, •




There are many who be I Lture
by IBM of many of its divisions and subsidia] 1 ill
lead to dominance by many smaller IBM's and serve no
real purpose. This was in fact the case when Standard
Oil was judicially broken up. With independent J
spin-offs competing with other co Les in more
specialized areas , many prospective customers nay still
prefer the -] products because of past experience
and the expectation that they will receive higher
quality because of T^i-l'" s observance of the consent
decree and the splitting legal action.
IBM has already ''unbundled" its programming
and software f] om its hardware pricing structure and
is now selling it independently in competition with
smaller software houses. The decrease in equipment
prices is roughly three percent. How other computer
firms will feel the pinch to do the same, like it or not.
Although continually faced with legal action,
IBM has built up a high quality reputation respected
by most customers, many competitors and the public.
Whatever the outcome of the present legal skirmish,
many agree that IBM will continue to be prosperous and
perhaps tern adversity into advantage.
Legally, IBM provides a challenging opponent for
the reds. In 1955, IBM hired Burke Marshall, former U.S.
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Assistant Ge L 3-» es *-ts - 1- counsel.
Marshall is now a corporation Vic '- it. In
1968 Nicholas de B. Katzenl h, former U.S. M:t< ey
General, ^ joined the IBM 1 1 si ' : as the current
aral Counsel, His staff was au; t ' ! tar
by Cyrus Vance, direct fro ; ;< the Paris Peace Tc ] :
and earl Dej ;.ty Secretary o£ D e.
It is foreseen that this battle will last well
into the 1970 's. As in the past, efforts at sup sssing
monopolies i th more d; nic industries such as data
process iris, are often outstrij J by t ;y. The
charges i today m have no place in the industry
of, say, 1975. The great: en;:, issues of 1936 and 1956
arc relatively unimportant as computers rely less heavily
on cards. The consent decree of 1956 made no mention of
software dominance or free education for customers,
both of which are vital now.
The outcome of the current lawsuits will
undoubtedly affect IBM's success. It may be, however,
that I3M's defense strategies and its evolution after
3-who ' s Who in Coi cce and Industry of 1968
.
^v/ho ' s I'/ho i and 3 >9. (New
York: A. N. Marquis Co. , 1^68") ~~p, 1172.
3 Ibid., p. 2552.
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jud it is handed dow be more importnat 1.
the judg its J. f
,
"Good fortune, ' timing, intelligence a.i
agressiveness sired IBM today. "1 It remains to b3
1 n whether these elements ill stand IBM in good
stead in the courtroom as well.
*"IBM and the Feds Make Three," p. 203.

111. FOUNDATIONS 0./ DEVELOPMENT
it_son
IBM was not fou: ' by Thomas J. Watson, yet
il 3 dev. - into today's successful company c in b
largely attributed to his leadership. Its corporate
cha . 3r, goals and beliefs were originally formulated
by the elder Watson. Most are perpetuated in one fo:
or another today, fourteen years after Thomas J, Watson's
death.
Few large industrial corporations have been so
heavily influenced by one man as IBM. Watson's role in
hip company may be equ* :d to those of Henry Ford,
Cornelius 7, ' lit or Charles Schwab. To understand
IBM, one must have some knowledge of its patriarch and
major devaloper, Thomas J. Watson,
Thomas Watson was born to modest agric ultural
surroundings in Painted Post, New York in 1893. At the
age of 18, and after one year at a small business and
accounting college, he left home to become a salesman.
In do doing, he forsook legal and teaching careers in




he enjoyed. In this case it was talking to people and
selling organs .
1
Watson was affected profoundly by his early sales
experiences. One of his first observations was what he
saw as the golden rule of business: "Good business is
a bargain that benefits both parties.' 1 ?- Torn Watson was
selling organs for C. B. Barron, whom he looked up to
as an icon of salesmanship; however, he looked on Barron's
unscrupulous bus ires s morality with groat distaste.
Watson regarded Barron as a good lesson in bad business
ethics, but took from h.' his grooming and dress standards,
which were to be reflected by IBM. salesmen years after
Watson's death.
3
The final great influence of young Tom Watson's
sales career was that of alcohol. Time after time he
saw otherwise successful salesmen succumb to whiskey
while on the road, and quickly squander any gains they
had made. Since those early days, Watson abstained and
strongly encouraged similar behavior on the part of his
associates.^1
It was in 1895 that Thomas Watson's career began
1 Be Id en and Be Id en. Lengthening Shadow. p. 5.






to blossom in earnest. In that year he went to work
for The National Cash Register Company. As before,
Watson proved to be an outstanding salesman. His
success led to rapid recognition by NCR President,
John H, Patterson, who was* a vigorous proponent of
written procedures for nearly everything and a noteworthy
aggress ive bus :' ness tactician. *-
Patterson promoted Thomas Watson to Assist.:
Sales Manager in 1903, after his successful administra-
tion of NCR's second-hand operation. It was then that
Watson became recognized as a better executive than he
was a salesman It should be noted, however, that
Watson mistrusted Patterson's many sales theories and
procedures. He made his reputation with NCR by modifi-
cation of these procedures and not through innovation.
In 1.912, Watson's career suffered a severe blow
when 30 NCR officials, including Patterson and Watson,
were indicted by the Justice Department as being in
violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, a result
of th^nr unscrupulous discrediting of competitors equipment.
LRodgers, Think. p. 82.
^B^lden and Belden, Lengthening Shadow. p. 33.
4-See Chapter II. (Legal Confrontations)
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Convictions were later brought about, but through a
series of appeals and the passage of time, Watson never
served the sentence.
Thomas Watson emerged from this experience
somewhat disillusioned with Patterson, severely humili-
ated, and instilled with a new sense of moral correctness
which was to dominate his behavior the rest of his life.-
The next year was one of great change for Thomas
Watson. He helped John Patterson and NCR rescue tl
citizens of Dayton, Ohio from the great flood of 1913.
Later that year he married J .tte Kittredge. And
finally, he was fired by Patterson; possibly for over-
zealousness, leading Patterson to believe the popular
o
Watson was attempting to seize too much power.
^
Although Watson was emotionally struck down by
this turn of events, he was determined to seek future
success, preferably on his own or with a small organization
in which he could make his mark quickly. After turning
down promising offers from such industrial giants as
General Electric and General Motors, Thomas Watson
accepted the position of Sales Manager with The Computing,
Tabulating and Recording Company. C-T-R, as it was called,
lRodgers, Think. p. 70.
2Be Id en and Be Id en, Le n g th e n ing Shad ow . p. 86.
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was a small holding company that owned Dayton Scale
Company, Tabulating Machine Company, International Tii
Recording Company and Bundy Manufacturing Company,. It-
had only recently been incorporated in June, 1911.
Under the guidance of C-T-R's primary owner,
Charles Flint, Thomas Watson succeeded to the Presidency
in 1915. He was instrumental in coordinating the \ Lous
C-T-R holdings into an integrated unit and incuicati
his high standards of conduct and salesmanship upon th
organization. Then in 1924, C-T-R merged with the small
International Business Machines Corporation and assumed
9its name.
~
The young IBM had already started to build its
main manufacturing facilities in Endicott, New York,
not far from the Watson homestead at Painted Post. Th
primary industry of that community at the time was the
Endicott- Johnson Shoe Company. Thomas Watson was be-
friended by George H. Johnson, President of the shc<L
company. Johnson had achieved great populeirity in his
organization through warmth, camaraderie, and physical




3 : lo d g er s
,
Think
. p . 71
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In Later years it became apparent that these charac-
teristics were to influence Watson's behavior as strongly
as the in ilate g of C. 3. Barron and the
rigorous regimentation and organization of John H.
Patterson, In many ways Watson and his company were to
become composites of all three individuals from the past.
Watson imposed many symbolic regulations on his
employi bs that were unique. Some remain in various and
unwritten forms today. He insisted that Employees
neither drink nor smoke, lite shirts and conservative
suits we: i prescribed for salesmen. There were numerous
company songs published and sung. . Watson continuously
admonished his salesmen to "Do Right J". To Watson, the
way to righteousness was clear. Me sought and received
avid loyalty from all employees and thoughtof them as
his family, Thomas Watson and his IBM were inseperable
entities. His perpetuation of the company image was
carried out on an almost evangelical plan'... Watson's
approach to building IBM prompted Thomas J. Watson, Jr,
9
to remark: "The company ]s in the family unconscious. n/-
In his unique manner, Thomas '•Jatson led IBM to
great annual gains between 1914 and the mid 1950' s.
Gross income increased from ?4, 1 million to $410 million,
L lbid.
, p. 149.
^Belden and Belden, Lengthening Shadow . p. 218.
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not income from $.5 million to 392,3 million, and c
dividends on common stock from nothing to $12,7 mil] Lon,
Assets were multiplied times 24, number of employees
times 34, development costs times 500, and data process:'
revenues times 316.1- Although it is hard to assess the
value of ATatson's various management philosophies, th
results of his efforts are indisputable.
In 1955, IBM was accused of restraint of trade
bee- i of its dominant rket position, which v ,
alleged to bo some 90 per cent. Watson, since his day
at NCR, had always operated in complete regard for th
law and federal regulation. As a -result, he opened
all I3M files to government scrutiny. ! is attitude wa
that IBM had von its market position fairly, through
sound business principles. The Justice Department demand
that IBM offer its machines for sale as well a? rent was
rebuffed by Watson, in that IBM provided service, not
machines, and therefore, leasing benefitted IBM's
o
customers. -
Thomas Watson vigorously opposed signing a
consent decree to satisfy litigation, because he inter-
preted! it as an admission of wrong-doing. What Watson






could :rstai 3 • afl the consent decree v
signed in 1956 by Thomas Watson, Jr., then President, was
that innocence is no excuse before the Law. tie w,- s of i
opinio--, that competitive success in America is virtuous,
and that bj s creates good; a philosophy that still
confronts anti-trust proceedings.
It is significant that, in his twilight years,
Thomas Watson's virtuous philosophies were to be shaken
by his beloved country's actions. The integrity which
permeated Watson's character and that of IBM was to be
rocked by the country's attitude toward bigness. Watson
found there were u lictable and refractory forces which
he, for the first time, could not influence shaping his
life. 2
Later in 1956, Thomas J. Watson died, and his
eldest son, Thomas J. Watson, Jr. succeeded him as
Chairman of the Board, where he still actively governs
the company. Giving up a successful career in the Air
Force, Tom Watson has led IBM on to even greater successes.
The youngest son, Arthur K. Watson, is presently Vice
Chairman of the Board and past Chairman of the World Trade








international business. He was recent appoint*
U.S. Ambassador to France, replacing S< it Shriver.
They are joined in their 1 ship of IBM by T. Vir
Learson, the forceful, dynamic, highly competitive and
demanding IBM President.- .
Under the new r >, many of the old standards
of the senior. Watson have disappeared, such as the IBM
songbook, stiff collars, and drinking and smokin boos.
But there remains the essence of Watson in the loyalty
of employees, conservative dress among salesmen, and the
perceptible belief in doing right. It would be naive
to assume, however, that this .belief is not strongly
influenced by the consent decree of 1955 and the
continuous scrutiny of the Justice Department. Never-
theless, loyalty among IBM employees in such a large
organization is unique and may be attributed to a
pervasive attitude that IBM is too good to be destroyed
by either competition or legal action. J
Aside from the other various indicators of growth
c\r^c\ success enumerated in. this research, it should be
noted that IBM now employs about 250,000 people, one ha
^
"Nixon Plans to Name IBM's Arthur Watson Ambassador
t o Fr a nee, " Wall Str e et Journa 1 , March 4 , 1970, p . 2
.
2Rodgers, Think. p. 249.
3ikid. , p. 283.
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of which are college graduates. Its stock market v
is more than all the gold held in Fort Knox. Significant
from an employee's point, of view, IBM is the world's
largest non-union company. The benevolence inspired by
George H. Johnson is apparent in the benefits received
by "IBM'ers", which exceed national union demands. *-
Corporate^ Beliefs __and__Goai s
.
IBM's character and business success is predicated,
on several beliefs, as set forth by Thomas J. Watson, Jr.
in 1963.^ These beliefs are simple, and although business
conditions and strategies change, the beliefs remain
unchanged
.
The first of these is respect for the individual
in the form of wages, job security, dignity, accomplish-
ment and involvement. Dignity is perpetuated through an
"open door" policy which is practiced as frequently as
possible, 3 ^i]_ business decisions are considered in
light of what may be right for IBM's people. *"
The second belief is that customer service should
1 Ibid., p. 9.
^Thomas J. Watson, Jr. A Busine ss and Its Beliefs:









be the primary business goal. Equipment and syste
are designed to fit customers' needs, rather than
fittin
.
sir needs to existing eq Lj snt.
Finally, IBM believes that it should pursue all
tasks with the idea they can be done in a superior
fashion. This embraces the philosophies of optimism,
enthusiasm, excitement, and pace,^
One of the foremost characterists of IBM success,
and yet one of the most enigmatic to its beliefs is
growth. Figures throughout this research attest to
the fact that IBM has grown at a rapid pace, hand-in-
hand with its data processing market.
Naturally, when such rapid expansion takes place,
management must make adjustments to compensate for
whatever changes take place. Many companies succeed or
fail upon how well they adjust to expanding business
scales
.
In adapting to growth, Thomas Watson, Jr. has
also enumerated the most significant lessons learned
through IBM's growth and the accompanying application
of IBM management beliefs. The first lesson, almost a







3PAA> , P. 71.
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cu rent technology in all relevant areas. Relevancy
in this c also expands with technological development
and company growth.
The second lesson is that education and two-way
cor.Krr.inic at ions between all. internal levels must be free
and open. in fact, when the company is growing, the
factors must be constructed at a rate exceeding t
growth rate to accommodate the geometric a lly expanding
communications network possibilities. The most vit.
intent of this lesson is that ail employees and . .ors
are aware of the importance and significance of the or-
ganization and their roles in it.
A short and self-expla ry lesson is that
complacency is deadly. In some ways this lesson was
ignored by the eld tson himself when he chose not
to buy the computer pioneering Eckert-Mauchly Company
in the early 1950 ' s . -• Univac, on the other hand is
seen to have not learned this lesson until too long




Large organizations growing even larger are apt
to become fragmented. The next lesson, then, is that
1 Rodgers, Think. p. 199.




divisional or departmental cooperation is essential.
Company interests should always assume a position ove:
all others within Che or ."is. This is in essence
the dilemna normally faced by decentralized companies
in selecting appropriate financial and management
controls.
The final lesson is that company beliefs must
always take precedence over goals, policies or pro-
cedures. Mr. Watson quotes British economist Walter
Bagehot: "Strong beliefs win strong men and then make
them stronger. " Then Watson adds : !,'And as men become
stronger, so do the organizations to which they belong."!
It is appropriate that Thomas Watson, Jr. projects
these beliefs r:nd lessons into future IBM operations. He
does so by stating that there must be a general recogni-
tion of national and public interests as a function of
corporate bigness.
More specifically, Mr. Watson asserts that in the
modern business environment there has to be continual
change, and that today's executive must think as a citizen
as well as a. businessman. In do doing, his planning must
be equally beneficial to employees, stockholders and the
country. Businessmen are, therefore, influential public
1Wat son, Jr. Beliefs. p. 73.
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leaders. X - pi blic is continuously insisting on social
betterment, and th world d is creativity, imagination,
and boldness. It is business management's responsibility
to meet those demands. *-
Specific ref r :es« to IBM's attempts to meet






IV. ORG 3 AT 10:'
Lzation ':>
_f_rYh fiatic
In order to understand IBM as a company, and
more imp -t, to understand wl the important
management positions are, it is useful to vie" th<
formal organization structure. Although much of
modern management philosophy centers around informal
organization patt 3 without particular regard to
or ' uio: 1 charts (i.e., Polaroid), IBM uses a formal
organization chart to clarify functions and reporting
channels for its m« iiploy :s. •
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the
organization structure, explore the rationale behind
that organization, examine recent orga ' tion changes,
and pinpoint key positions in the organization so that
the individuals filling these positions may be
des ignated
,
Exhibit II is a basic portrayal of the IBM formal
organization, with reporting responsibility shown by
connecting lines. In typical fashion, IBM is controlled




nediately re::_- ibl( to the board of dir .tors is
Che IBM corporaCe office headed by che CI ' of the
Board of Directors, Presid t, Vic : Chai n of th
Board and the most se ior vice preside. This is
th • main oj ional co itrol group; however, there is
also an Executive Co trnittee op ' Lng in conjunction
with Che Corporate Office or: matters of long range
planning and policy. It consists of the C3 : lan of
the Board, Prea^-: : it
,
Vice Chaii of the Board c
is chaired by foi ] Ldent, Albert Williams,
It provides an executive forum fo .' , Williams'
extensive r ience in the corporation ; past
r\-:-:. idei t.
Reporting directly to Che Chairman of the Bo.: .
is the Manage nt Committee, consisting of three senior
vice-presidents, end a specie;! m gement staff consist-
ing of one senior vice president and two vice presidents.
The Management Co nittee advises the Chairman largely
on operational matters. The management staff is concerned
primarily with executive resources, management systems,
and other matters relating to the execution of management
procedures
.
Reporting to the President are the Vice President/
Chief Scientist, the Vice President/General Manager of
the Data Processing Group (of divisions), and the Vice
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President/ Group Executive of all other divisions except
Research, and Real Estate and Construction divisions.
Data Processing Group contains six divisio
responsible for development, manufacturing and marketing
of all standard computer or data processing systems.
The other group is comprised of divisions responsible
for development, manufacturing, and marketing of all
non-standard data processing systems plus all non-data
processing products. In addition, it also contains t
wholly-owned subsidiaries, Science Research Associates
and Service Bureau Corporation. The precise functions
of these divisions and subsidiaries are discussed in
late r p ar a gr a ph s
.
Report ins to the Vice Chair-nan of the Board are
the Vice President General Counsel, Vice President
Director of the Research Division, and the Vice President
Chairman and President of the world Trade Corporation
(a wholly-owned subsidiary managing all international
affairs). This alignment has been induced primarily
because Arthur K. Watson, brother of Chairman Thomas J.
Watson, Jr. is the former Chairman of World Trade Corpora-
tion and has extensive experience in international matters
Reporting to the Senior Vice President are the
Vice President in charge of the Corporate Operations and
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Services Staff, and Senior Vice President in charge of
the Corporate Finance and Planning Staff. The Corporate
Operations end Services Staff oversees matters concern-
ing administration, commercial development, communications,
engineering proa i-ng, technology, manufacturing,
marketing, personnel, programming, service, standards,
real estate and construction. it also houses the
corporate secretary and his staff. The Corporate
Finance and Planning Staff is concerned with all
financial, planning and internal data process
i
systems matters. It is the staff in which the Controller,
Treasurer arc! Chief Economist operate. As is often the
case, both staffs cross operational division lines,
providing continuity and access to vital information.
The various IBM divisions and subsidiaries form
the operational functions of the company. All research,
product development, manufacturing, marketing, customer
services and facilities development matters are executed
in these organizational entities. Descriptions of their
respective functions are as follows :*
THE ADVANCED SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT DIVISION explores
product and business areas new to IBM, establishes their
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potential value, and isfers product response
bility to the co nt operating group (i.e., Data
Processing Group) or division for f r development,
manufacti Lng. It is related to the
research effort, but is oriented prim rily to potent]
markets and customer requirements.
THE COMPONENTS DIVISION develops, manufactures
and pure! 3 electronic components used in IBM data
processing systems. It is this division which would be
responsible for drawing specific* ; for and purchasi:
of electronics components such as transistors and modular
microcircuitory from other suppliers, foreign and domestic.
The Components Division is part of the Data Processing
Grot! p.
THE DATA PROCESSING DIVISION markets the full
IBM line of information-handling systems, equipment and
supplies through branch offices throughout the United
States. The only exceptions to this array of product
responsibility are the low-cost data processing equipments,
such as unit record (punched card) equipment, card input/
output machines, data acquisition and control equipment,
and trie newly-announced, small System/3. The Data




THE . SYSTEMS DIVISION concentrates on
advanced technology and systems for ground-based,
airbo?:ne and space-borne information-handling and
control needs of the U.S. Government. It is this
division which is participating actively in the national
space program.
THE FIELD ENGINEERING DIVISION is a part of
the Data processing Group. It provides maintenance
and related services for IBM's domestic information
handling systems and equipment. All repairs, mainten-
ance and updating of customers equipment under contract
are accomplished by this division through the various
local branch offices.
THE GENERAL SYSTEMS DIVISION is another member
of the Data Processing Group and is responsible for
manufacturing, development and programming activities
in the area of the low-cost data processing equipment
not managed by the Data Processing Division. This divi-
sion is meant to place a special focus on the "low end"
of the product spectrum, which in many cases benefit from
marketing techniques and expertise different from the
larger computer systems
.
THE INFORMATION RECORDS DIVISION develops,
*- IBH Dat a Processing Group Letter of November 5,
1969 by R. A. Russack DPG#4 11/5/69,"
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manufactures and markets data processing cards and
paper forms, :-.. *tic ti nd other consumable products
used in informatio idling systems. Its product line
also includes sy; s and services for the storage,
retrieval, distribution and display of business records.
This division may be more aptly described as being in
the supplies business.
THE OFFICE PRODUCTS DIVISION develops, manufac-
tures, markets and services electric typewriters,
magnetic typewriters, dictation eon.' t, cold -type
publication composing equipment, and related supplies.
These are all the hardward products not directly
related to computers and data processing systems.
THE REAL ESTATE AND CONSTRUCTION DIVISION arranges
for the design, construction, purchase or lease of facili-
ties, including the planning and location of sites. It
has cognisance over plants and laboratories in 25 U.S.
cities plus 17 plants in Argentina, Brazil, Canada,
Columbia, France, West Germany, India, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, The Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
During 1968 this division was managing construction of
14 new foreign and domestic facilities, and expansion of
19 others. The Real Estate and Construction Division has
placed branch offices in virtually every major city in
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the U.S. and in many small cities. i the only
divi: ' 'ating in a staff environment (Corporate
Operations and Se: .' 3 Staff) because of the central. iz
requirement of coordinated facilities development and
capital investment,
THE R ' DIV1SI0 is independent of any otn
organizational 3 nt and reports directly to the Vice
Chairman of the Board of Directors. It develops ac ced
concepts, technologies, devices and computer appl ' ' ms
to provide new and better solutions to c lers • infor
t ion-handling requirements. 1 M consistently devotes
considerable attention and funding to this division,
which is so vital in a rapidly advancing technology arc
compe t it ive environment
.
TH£ SYSTEK3 DEVELOPMENT DIVISION develops, through
a multinational effort, IBM's regular product line of
information-handling systems and equipment, includi
system-related computer programming support. It is a
Data rrocessing Group component.
THE SYSTEMS HANUFACTURIi^G DIVISION is the last
member of the Data Processing Gro^p. It manufactures




TH ! IB ' )R] > TRADE G I > >j is a who 11]
own i subsid ' in 1950 for the purpose of
manag:
_
LI non-U. S. transactio s a 'I products
directly or through other wTG subside tries. The
Corporatior now operates in 106 foreign countries
and is at ting to do so using national residents
of the resped '" 3 countries as much as possible.
SCIE CS R : '. 3E AS30CIATSS , IMC. is r subsidiary
: hich dey lops n.d publii i a ' id« ranj 3 of learni
and guii c rials arc intelligence, aptitude a
achieves t . ts for schools, gover and industry.
It was a< :'. :: Fel r try, 1964 for the purpose of
giving a more s tbst< itia] 1 5e t-o IBM's ambitious cus-
tomer education program,
THE SERVICE Bl LEAD CORPORATION is another wholly-
owned subside formed in 1957, offering domestic
organizations business data processing services as veil
-. s computer programming services or a daily, weekly,
monthly or ore •-job basis. This corporatior is presently
the most active element in the promising area of compute:
time-sharing by remote customers on an on-line basis.
The marketing of all IBM products in the U.S.
takes place through ar interesting structure, calculated
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to mal ' ! mi 1 s i of i ; re
1 jst i
expertise within I] . since 1961, IBM h;
special: .a g sales efforts by cu store sr indu try tyj
(i.e., b- J i '3, transportation, manufact . i in-
surance, gove .- t admi '. tion and education).
In some larger metropolitan areas there are separate
branch org a .tiers for groups of these customer
types.
The marketing structure is basically bra"
down into five regions, three of which are geographic
and the remaining two are by industry type. The geogra-
phic division en into n, Midwestern and Wests
Regions, These regions are further divided into
districts which contain branch offices in the various
cities of the districts. The essential marketing
entity is the branch, which tries to maintain close
liaison with its customers through its various industry-
specialized marketing representatives
,
The other two regions are the Government, Education
aire Medicine Region, a^A the Commercial Region, which in-
cludes utilities, airlines, stock markets and other
large public use industries. All other industries are
covered by the geographic regions, except federal
government scientific development which is covered
independently by the Federal Systems Divisions.
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The G iucation and Medicine Region
operates overs;,/- as well as in the U.S., providing
marketing services for the World Trade Corporation
in these araas/
It is obvious that 'the emphasis in this structure
is to provide the maximum concentration of IBM experience
to given market areas. In addition, IBM marketing
effort is very fluid in bringing the most knowledge
to bear on specific marketing situations across






Within recent years, several changes have taken
place in the IBM organization which reflect modern
thinking within the company. These changes have come
about for various reasons, but each one was inspired
by motivations which may give insight into the I3M
corporate character.
As previously mentioned, the consent decree of
1956 signed by IBM in answer to charges that IBM was
monopolistic and possibly in restraint of trade had
profound effects on IBM. As a result of that action,
IBM segregated most of its data processing services for
customers and formed the wholly-owned subsidiary,
•Kenneth Allen, Private interview held at IBM
Information Services, Washington, December 1969.
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Service Bureau Corporation. IBM now perforn no work
for customers, but relies on the SBC for this function.
Actually, in m ' stances, SBG and IBM become
competitors when a potential customer is undecided as
to whether to purchase or 'lease equipment:, or hire
another company to do the job.
>/ifh the advent of computers which can process
many jobs concurrently and communicate with small remote
terminal.? while processing, computer services have be-
come feasible for many small businesses which could not
previously afford them. It is in this area, plus
contract computer prog] Lng services, that the SBC
is making its greatest strides to date. It is also
this area, however, for which IBM and SBC are bein
criticized by some competitors who claim that SBC is
obtaining equipment and some systems expertise from I !
at a cost below that of competitors, IBM and SBC, of
course, deny the charge, and. the issue has not yet been
decided. In any event, IBM's attempts to satisfy
judicial challenges in 1956 are now being challenged
again. As a result, all real-time and on-line data
communications applications have now been turned over
to the SBC and rate structures have been reexamined to
insure non-competitive pricing does not exist.
About 1960 IBM realized that the data processing
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1 too Large for the general
sale to effectively ige, just as the medic
pre' i ion now spawns i neral practitioners.
So Local branch offices were broken down into industry
specialty areas , with a keting team dedicated to
each given industry type. About 1965 this specializa-
tion philosophy underwent further refinement. In
'
'
an areas separate branch offices were
established for certain in : y types and the
geographical regional marketing structure wan further
spli he Commercial Region and Government,
Education and Medical Region,
These changes reflected the IBM attitude that
since computers must be structured to perform a great
share of a customer's tasks in a way acceptable to the
customer, the sales representative must become int ' ly
familiar with the workings of not only the customer's
company, but also its entire industrial environment.
This is in consonance with IBM's long standing emphasis
on intensive marketing techniques emphasizing customer
service.
In 1964 IBM established the Executive Committee,
composed of Chairman of the Board, Thomas J,, Watson, Jr.,
^resident, T, Vincent Learson, Vice Chairman, Arthur'
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K. Watson and Executive Committee Chairman, Albert
Williams. Mr. Williams sj 28 active years with
IBM culminating with his terra as corporal" lor President
from 1961 to 1966. Because of his experience and
knowledge of IBM, he was requested to remain acti.ve
in the organization (he is also a director) through
tne Executive Committee. It is interesting that this
group would be formed to retain the counsel of one
man who was not widely known for dynamic and personal
influence on corporate character.
Also in 1964, IBM acquired Systems Research
o
Associates as a subsidiary. Although the IBM
educational system for emplo] &i d customers had
for years set the pace in modern industry, IBM felt
that the area of testing and instructing in modern
universities was of a highly technical nature,
provided the degree of professionalism required. Among
the obvious purposes for SRA's alliance with IBM is the
increasingly important area of proper selection and
^'IBn's $5,000,000,000 Gamble," T. A. Wise.
Fortune. September 1966, p. 118.
2»»Momentus Days at IBM," Fortune , March 1966,
P. 56.
o




training of people to do the many highly technical jobs
in IBM and in cust< . ' organizations. Because of the
ever greater demand for people in cur industrial
society, emphasis on personnel selection and educatio
certainly seems to be well* founded. It is not a new
area of enthusiasm with IBM.
host recently (iovamber 1969) IBM formed the
General Systems Division which places separate manaj "it
responsibility on development, manufacture and. program-
ming activities relating to low-cost data processing
equipment. This is an effort to differentiate between
the large and medium scale computing systems and the
small systems and peripheral devices used by small
business customers, in the realization that the needs
of these customers are indeed different. This differ-
entiation will help to ensure that these low-cost products
are not designed with features not required or- wanted by
the small customer, and hence will save him money.
It can be readily seen that most of the recent
changes mentioned above relate directly to IBM's customers
in an effort to render better support. Of the remaining
changes, one relates to judicial action and the other to
executive leadership. legal confrontation will most
certainly continue to shape ISM philosophy for many years
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to com !, nd it is e: , that IB A will be as
accommodating to the courts as is feasible. It is
or.co iraging to see that IBM at times builds its
organization around people and not the converse.
The Executive Committee established for Mr. Williams'
and Arthur K, Watson's elevation to Vice Chairman of
Board (a new position) in 1966, - with responsibility
over areas relative to his greatest experience, both




The corporate organization chart in Exhibit II
furnishes a good base for selecting the IBM cxecut:
.
to be examined in Chapter V. Executives in charge of
nearly all capt: > c; on the chert have been d ted
as appro, i • te, total number of e jcutives studied
is 43. Lnation of the organization chart reveals
more than 43 captions. In some instances one utive
is performing in more than one capacity on the chart.
The executives coming under this study are
designated by functional area rather than name as
follows
:
All members of the Corporate Office group and
the Executive Committee; all members of the Management
lWorld 'he's "_ho in Commerce and Industry,




Committer ; nd the i ff ; the Chief Sc ; - Lst/
Vice President:; the Data Process! . Sroup General Manager/
tfice Presid and all Division Presidents or General
Man? i 3 within the group; the Group Executive/Vice
Ldent for the "miscellaneous " grc rid all its
Division Lc ts or . :al Managers; the Chairman
of the Board of the Service Bureau Corporation; th
General C( L/Vi< President; the President of tl
World Trace Corporate /vice President; the Vice Presi-
d ' C : of P irch; the Vice President in Charge
of the Corporate Operations and Services Staff and
executives in ch of all staff • functions listed
11 ider him; the Senior ' President in charge of the
Corporate Final and PI ing Staff and executives in
charge of all staff functions listed under him, The
total number of positions designated is 48, while the
number of individuals totals 43.
It may be noted that all members of the Board of
Directors not employed by IBP as officers have been
omitted from the study because they come from outside the
company and their characteristics are not likely to have
come -n ndar the influence of IBM evening their more forma-
tive years, as is the case with most IBP career executives.
The same cone] it ion applies to the President of Science

68
Research Asso< ' s, Ire., be< > that firm, ale
with its i tives, was acq i externally by ]
z: no .' have the basic ground work to proceed
with the examination of these 43 men who have gun 3 1





ics and Stand a rds
,
In the last chapter the various in snt positions
to be analyzed were identified. For specific analytical
purposes, the individuals currently filling each one of
these positions have also been identified through the
courtesy of IBM, Who f s [3 i in Commerc try, and
3Poor ' s R of Corporat i.ons , . tor one Executives.
Names of these individuals in this analysis serve no
useful purpose; therefore, they are omitted.
The standard or "control group" against which




r This book has been compiled under
the auspices of the Stanford University Graduate School
of Business and contains a survey of the most significant
1-Letter from Donald H. Reck, IBM Information
Adminis trat or , Armoi ik , N. Y. , De c . 11, 19 6 9
.




(New York: Marquis Pho's <,,;ho, 1968).
^Standard and Poor. Poor f s Register of _Gor_p_orations,
Dire
c
tors and Executives in U.S . ar 1 mad
a
. ;w York:
Standard and Poors Corp., 1969).




characteristics of 310 top m- mt personnel.
These tent personnel are employed by 15 di
ferent cc Lons from 15 different industries.
Although the book does not identify these corpor ins,
each is purporl " to be a ieader in its respective
industry.
As a statistical co ration, it may be noted
the i is not one of the 15 firms constituting the
TopMaru survey.
The categories of characteristics used in the
survey are largely those extracted from IBM executive
biographies! data. These characteristics are: medi*
and average age, medial and average tenure with the
firm, number of coil degrees held, most frequent
starting job functions, pr.imary job functions, 1;
job function prior to most recent: promotion, multi-
functional job experience, red most frequent routes to
top management promotions. In addition, certain charac-
teristics within the IBM executive group will be discussed,
Hanageme n t Stat istics
.
1. AGS. The average of the survey group is 56 years
and the median ?ge is 57. Both the average and median age
1- Letter from Carlton A. Ped arson, Professor of business
Management and director of the Stanford -Sloan Program,
Stanford University, Dec. 8, 1969,
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of the IBM top it group is 51. While not a
tling differ :e, it does indicate that ] :
to value youth and r maining productive man; snt
potential at le< hi hly as other successful industrial
f irms
.
2. 'i ,. The survey group showed an average
tenure of 29 \ and i iian tenure of 30 years.
Similar figures fee IBM are 24.5 and 23 years, respec-
tively. This t ids to reinforce the previous conclusion,
but adds the ir i snt of promotion speed. Apparently
IBM tends to have ad ced its executives fester then
the su: oup, and not merely ! ' them at a
younger age.
3. ADVANCED 501 IATI0I\T
.
In this area, 13 per cent
of surveyed executives held no college d
5
while
only 7 pur cent of IBM executives he-7 none. Fifty- five
per cent of the survey p held one degree, as compared
to 53.5 per cent of the IBM group. Similarly, 24 per
cent of the surveyed executives held two degrees to IBM's
25.5 per cent. Three or more degrees were held by 8
per cent of the survey group and 14 per cent of IBM
executives. The only variation here is that IBM tends
to have more executives at the high extreme and fewer at
the low extreme (no degrees). There is a very close
correlatior between both groups for those executives
































Source: Holden, Pederson and Germane, Top Man : .
pp. 233-55.
Letter from D. K. Reck, December 11, 1959.
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.•:'hile the Tog I sur y did not aver to
institul Lo s by which degrees were conferred, it is
i] Ceresting to note that within tb J ! ;roup, 16 j -
cent received at least one d< from harvard University,
37 per cer:L received at least one degree from an Ivy
League university, and 51 per cent received at least one
degree from what would normally be called an "Eastern 1 '
institution. It is difficult to draw a conclusion from
these statistic;., bit two hypotheses cor;:;.', to mind: that
"Eastern 1 ' or Ivy League schools have historically
equipped managers more adequately than others for IBM's
purposes; or that IBM's historical roots and corporate
power are located in the eastern United States, creating
an affinity between IBM and eastern graduates. These
hypotheses are offered for the reader's speculation only,
and may not be unique to IBM,
4. STARTING JQ~< FUNCTIONS. The functional area
in which execut.ives begin their career with an organization
is sometimes useful in viewing selection philosophy and
company attitudes toward personnel resources,
The survey group shewed that most executives
entered their respective businesses in the functional
areas of production, engineering, accounting and finance.
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Somewhat Lower o :he List, but aLso significant were
the areas of research and sting.
An anaiysis of the IBM group reveals the
majority of aLi executives (56 per cent) entering the
4
firm in the marketing areas. Research is the next most
common area of entry for IBM executives (L8.5 per cent),
but it should bo noted that some of ths s< gment entered
the organization as mature professionals, later in their
careers. Mo other functional areas are significantly
frequent as starting positions fo 3 . executives, as
can be seen by the percentages in Exhibit IV.
This overwhelming tendency toward marketing bears
out the senior Watson's legacy to the organization. It
is the single most conspicuous characteristic unique
to IBM.
5. PRIMARY JOB FUNCTIONS. While executives are
progressing in their careers, they are most often assigned
to one function more than any other. This is the primary
job function.
The most frequent primary functional occurrence
in the survey group by far was production (35 per cent),
with marketing (19 per cent) and accounting (L7 per cent)
pLacing a distant second and third piace. Vie can see a
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trend toward production in these firms as a common
managemen tern, and away from engineering
and accounting as these executives progressed from
starting jobs into p: ' y functions. There is also
a slight rise in the proportion of executives entering
marketing after starting in another functional area,
On the other hand, IBM executives seem to have
continued in the marketing area for the most part (49
per cent). The next most predominant function remains
research. Exhibit IV shows a slight trend toward
production and very low frequencies in those areas as
starting jobs, Some who started in i ting branched
into these functions as primary career specialities.
The indication here is that marketing is a vital
prerequisite to career development in IBM. It: continues
to be the most frequent area throughout most executives 1
careers, but some others have branched into production
and finance after having gained an appreciation for the
marketing considerations which are so dominant in IBM's
bu s i ness ph i 1 o s ophy
.
6. JOB FUNCTION PRIOR TO MOST RECENT PROMOTION.
The trend among the surveyed executives continues to
gravitate toward production (45 per cent) and marketing
(27 per cent), during the later stages of their careers.
Conversely, Exhibit IV shows a trend away from engineering,
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research, and finance. This confirms what one might
logically suppose; that production is one of the most
vital functions in an industrial corporation, with
marketing also playing an important role.
Within Ilk
,
executives have been promoted to
their present positions mostly from the marketing area
in roughly the same proportion in which they developed
their entire careers. All other functional areas exist
as stepping stones to executive positions in about the
same relative frequency as primary functions.
7. MULTIFUNCTIONAL EXPERIENCE. Another indicator
of the character of corporate management is whether their
careers have developed in a single function or multiple
functions. Single function experience development
indicates that an organization considers a function(s)
or such overriding importance that significant exposure
to other areas is less important than depth of experience
in that favored function.
Among executives in the survey group, 44.9 per
cent had single function experience and 55.1 per cent
worked in more than one functional area; roughly half
and half. In IBM 74.5 per cent of all executives stayed
in a single function prior to becoming a company officer,
with only 25.5 per cent working in multiple functions.
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These statistics, of course, corroborate earlier
indications of IBM's history of emphasis on the
marketplace,
8. SUMMARY OF MAJOR ROUTES TO THE TO?.
Generally, executives in the survey group progressed
to corporate offices most often in the area of tech-
nology and production. The next most frequently
travelled path was marketing, followed by accounting,
finance and legal areas.
As we have seen, the most well, traversed
executive route in IBM is marketing, followed at
some distance by production and finance.
Other IBM : ' ei^^t:_Chara(^_eris_ti.cs
.
Line versus staff experience is a frequent
subject of discussion with regard to top management
character. Of all surveyed executives, 72 per cent
progressed through their careers in line functions.
The IBM pattern shows line experience at about 82 per
cent, with only occasional exposure of these executives
to staff functions.
The inference here is that IBM values the
executive who has had experience with operational areas
even more highly than successful industrial corporations
in general. Again, this chnracteris tic is manifested
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primarily in the marketing area.
Cnl.y about 39 pel cent of IBM executives have
worked for other org< i '. :i< ;, 'hile no similar
statistic was extracted, in the Top snt survey,
this percentage is not high when considering the great
d 1 of job mobility i soit other industrial areas
such as oil companies, and the rate at which various
ma: keting org i: ations change personnel. The in: nee
hare is that there is substantial loyalty among IBM
exec e ives to their corporation,
This research has sho that there is a gr< at
deal of homogeneity among IB e: scutives. host have
one or t: 7o college degrees, and many from eastern
universities. Unwritten standards of dress and conduct
have long held an important place ir IBM's his tor}7
.
The great predominance of executive experience is
singularly i " the area of marketing,, Formal an
d
?
continuing education is held in high regard. " Over half
of all executives have served in the armed forces,
including Thomas J„ Watson who was an Air Force Colonel,
and Arthur X. Fatson, who was an Army Major, both serving
3
extensively overseas during and after Forld War II.
•-Rodgers. Think. p. 112.
2Fatson, IE Beliefs. p. 61.
3Rodgers. Think. p. 222.

co o ( o O o O
• • • • • • •
•i. o> i
»






CO O; r - CM CM
1 l!
|j




























































































































































































.rly 63 per cent of all are
48 and 59 Df age, UL are acti-s i
local, civic • 3 social o: ' ' ; d '
reside ?tia 1 areas
.
In o le :. : 1 1 i "' I . ! 2 led as
restrictive to rnent in much the m n r of i •
br ' ig. This is hi it; -" its s trictes t s se,
ar. ' t >- to th ; t C s - i ii the IB I
exec tivc gro ij most prol : ' leficial in t'
it p] >t( i la: ity of objective a id oti , i
ecutivs appreciation of c goals is essential
to unity, ; -.6 mo: le, and productivit3
of individ - "• throughout th< o . ,- ization.
Tb , • is, however , one :?- k ofte • le by
Chairman atson which may te 5 to belie further
a 'plification of this philosophy of ity.
He says
,
- b are always looking for mora 'wild ducks'. "1
This stat tment indi< ites a view of homogeneity t :mp r d
by - perceptive desire for 5 itr* sness throughout
the organizatio , Innovatioi has long beer a ke}? to
entrepre ;ei ral success; however, Mr, !atson undoubtedly
sees it as increasi ig in importance with the ups- rge in
the c; ;ics of the international society and marketpla* e,
-*- at so;-, I \ He] ie f s , p. 27.

71. TH2 ?U1 1 :
i
The question of top-
.
lent proc a nt
ultimately resides in t3 I >ader area of recruitii
.
and selection of personnel, IBM, because of its
beliefs in obtaining and retain 1 '
;
good people, i:
Lcularly concerned, as is al] ••-, n t.
In some circles, people being c lized
as an asset or the she t to be offset by
fluctuations ir owners ' equity. Likewise, some
income statements show monetary gains zr6 losses in
personnel valuation. This extent of personnel
emphasis has been recently furthered by the University
of Michigan team of R, Lee Brummet and Rensis Likert
ir- their experiments at the R. G, Barry Corporation, i-
It is logical to look for expansion of this concept into
the executive management area, including quantitative
evaluations of both individuals and events.
The above example points up the value being placed
*-"How Much is Help forth?", Business ek,




or. people in general i particular by
contempora: y American businesses. Mana
personnel a ow being looked upon as a scarce
resource which 3t be competed for and conserved.
Preparations for the future in this area wJL.ll re-
quire better use of talent, more com ' work
environments, interesting challenges and consistent
rewards for efforts.
Factors involved in this evolution are the
national birthrate decline , national growth in
numbers and size of compar5.es; increasing business
complexity and greater demands from outside industry
(i.e.. govern us nt , social organ izat ions , and inter
-
national aid). To live with these restrictions,
businesses will have to either reduce the number of
executives required per function, identify and hold
only good talent, increase the future supply of executive
talent: through training and experience, or upgrade their
personnel functions, or most likely do all four.
Ingredients in the personnel area which must be
developed or enhanced to remain competitive in the field
of executive talent are the following: manpower assessment,
*-Arch Patton. "The Coming Scramble for Executive






promotion process analysis and a thorough skills
inventory, whether it is capitalized or not.
:elovich Survey of "The top 500 !i in-
dustrial companies as determined by Fc =j shows
some profound pi , }' - ' iJLly, these phenomena
result in a true generation gap in business manage-
ment emerging from the impatience of young managers
and the resi Iting insecurity of the older executives.
This insecurity stems from the younger men's unwiLLinj
ness to work their way up in the business hierarchy,
and their lack of motivation by money and position.
The : -ket for people and talent today is so
demanding that high performers are showing a great deal
of mobility among all businesses. The new motivators
are now recognition, satisfaction, responsibility, and
challenge. Many young people see these motivators more
readily accessible outside the business community where
there is on opportunity for participation in, and
formulation of, change. In order to satisfy these
people and attract them to business management careers 9
companies are now having to allow young people the
oppe:*;-:uri':y to run and influence their organizations
1Robert S. Diamond. "What Business Thinks."
Fortune. December 1969, p. 115.

; 3 show them thi t the business o: ' Cion is changeable.
In many cases, companies are rei ' g for this speci-
fic p'jrpose.--
The volatile nature of th >rican social climate
today is having g effects on business. Young people
are more aware of domestic and world social problems than
every before. As a result, industry has realized that it
must be in tun Lth tl same social factors in order to
aboid possible alienation by new generations, and to
attract nn6 utilize the greatest amoung of talent possible
from those generations.
Specific issi>es aroui • which the current social
demands are centered involve humanitarian equality,
environmental conditions, war, and in general, the
quality of life,,
IBM has responded to these demands in various ways.
In the area of equal employment opportunity, IBM is engag
in multiple programs involving employment, training and
community rehabilitation on its own and in cooperation
with other organizations. It actively recruits in a
number of Negro colleges, and attempts to hire marginally
L ibid,, p. 116.

85
qualified employees on the basis of desire and i
Under the ai :es of the National Alliance of Business-
n, IBM is conducting a program to employ and train
"hard core" employables in four urban areas. *-
More specifically, IBM opened a manufacturing
plant in the Bedford-Stuyvesant ghetto area of Brooklyn
in 19§8 which produces electronic cables and power supplies
The plant employs about 500 local residents. IBM is also
sponsoring a "Street Academy" training program for
2
disadvanl youths to prepare them for college entrance.
IBM has been applying its talents to other socially
o
I 2f icial areas as follows
:
The subsidiary, Science Research Associates, is
conducting pilot research and field testing of DISTAR,
a new learning system for the educationally disadvantaged
and below standard student. Six Chicago schools are being
supplied with material and personnel to consult with
teachers and evaluate the system's progress,
IBM in Geneva, Switzerland has been working with
the World Health Organization to set up a bio-medical
information service in 58 countries.




A water pollution sy I has beei sstabli
in Monpellier, France, and :at:her \ sis is be: g
conducted at the IBM Sc:' itific G ter, including i
pollution monitor! g a id i odel-building features.
I3K has dev lop a 'system to optimize the use
and distribution of police r.i: rer. It has also
developed another system to maintain status of poli
vehicles and their sector assig] ts in [few York City
in o?rder to facilitate faster response to emergencies.
An automatic fare collection system has been
established by IBM for the Bay Area Rapid Trans it-
District (BART) in San I''ic'r.cisco
5
California, using
magnetic credit cards instead of tokens.
IBM's Advanced Systems Development division is
working with the Urban Housing Model for the National
Urban Coalition's Task Force on Urban Housing, Develop-
ment and Investment. This model considers cost of land,
acq-.iis it ion , construction, investment, and return on
investments
.
It is apparent from the above projects that IBM
is striving to make itself as attractive as possible
as a socially conscious and progressive organization,
as well as an active participant in the shaping of our future
lives and environment . It is this type of consciousness

87
which is being shown by many Leading industrial organi-
zations today. As a practical , it must be stated
that in our capitalistic system, the motivations for such
actions may be- traced back to profits and satisfaction of
stockhoIder s th r ough better t a nd more competen
t
cutives.
iponse to Future Ma :s.
The foregoing remarks r ding social pb
have been most often referred to as "anti-establishment"
sentiments among y young people. Where this relates
to business, there is a common feeling that most college
graduates are not attracted to business careers
,
Surprisingly, IBM management finds little evidence
of these aversions in young people. However, IBM specifies
that they are hiring many young people, most of whom have
new attitudes, expectations, ideals and a desire to change
things for the better. This reflection is in accord with
previous findings of this research.
Chairman Watson made the following comments to IBM
management in December, 1959 on this very subject:
If we want to lead people like this, we
must demonstrate that we do not fear change,
*-"What Business Thinks," p. 115.

but welcome it as a i li £e. T
truth is, (: ' .;
radical than the tr : ' 2 business
corpoj atio i, its life blood.
Most great co ' ; chan they
grow, or else they do not long survive.
Yet in the contacts we have with
young people, we find ,ny of them do
not perceive ch as a dy \a nic factor
in business. Too often they don't see
b syond the web of rules and jargon that
characterize large organizatio Tb y
con't see us responding to the needs of
our age.
As mai s, or t1 itude toward
such ns' rs c< - ake a big difference.
If a ne loyee comes through with an
id e a , don't just te 1 1 h im we * ve looke d a
t
that before and reject d it. Circumstances
y have changed. The new employee may have
new factors or a different approach. It is
our job always to be on the lookout for ideas
that can be developed into constructive change.
Except for the basic beliefs, we are
prepared to change almost ig about
this company. This is the me we need
to get across to the new generation. Your
attitude will tell the story better than
any words ,
i
It is apparent tin; t there is emphasis on the subject
of attracting bright, young people within the IBM organizat-
ion. In addition, IBM conducts public affairs seminars
every year with college students who are employed for the
summer by IBM in order to obtain rapport and feedback on
-*- Letter from Walter J. Pedicord, IBM Vice President,
Personnel, Armouk, Is. Y. , January 6, 1970.
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- c Cion to the attitudes and values of yo op', s.
Those seminars attracted 1500 stude ts in 1969,
Early in 1969, IBM sponsored the first a ;nual
student symposium entitled "The Corporation, 1970."
rited were 40 student leaders from various U.S. campuses
to confer with various IBM executives and guests from
other areas of business, universities and sci- tific
groups. The purpose of the symposium was to learn first-
hand the students views on subjects vitally important to
them and to the rican corporation. Areas discussed
were: technology and society, the corporate role in
urban affairs, corporations and government, corporate
life on, the inside, and corporate involvement overseas.
Although no new truths were formulated or advanced,
the discussions were candid and intense. The major goal
was achieved, in that two generations met and listened to
each other, perhaps creating better understanding.
It is the idea that both the corporation and the po-
tential future executive now attending college need to become
better understood that is most important. Understanding and
mutual appreciation between these two groups which are so
essential to our society is the only counterforce to
continued polarization.
I lbid.
2"At Think Seminar, Students, Executives Parry
and Probe," Think Ma ;azine. i'ovember- December 1969, p. 18
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Aside from social attitudes and the br d considera-
tions affecting the character of IBM's future executives,
there is perhaps a more subtle and immediate change taki
place in the IBM organization. It is the slight drift fr
the historically pervasive marketing emphasis toward
technology,
IBM has always been technologically adequate, but
never a real pioneer in the hardware area. As long as t"
ipment has been competitively satisfactory, IBM success-
fully chose to devote its efforts to salesmanship and
thorough customer support.
~
In 1954, IBM gambled that an entire new range of
co. - srs (System/360), superseding nearly all others in
its own product line as well as those of its competitors,
would be successful enough to profitably justify the five
billion dollar inv ant required. The significance of
the decision to go ahead with the project is not so much
that it has bee-.- successful to date, but that it was made
at the recommendation primarily of the System's developers
and not its prospective sales managers . ^ In so doing, IBM
overlayed its traditional marketing disciplines with
disciplines of science.
"IBM's Tough Test." Bus ines s Week . December 20,
1969.
2Wise, "IBM's Gamble," p. 120.
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Several notable characteristics were brought
about: in IBM as a result: of the System/360 decision.
For the first time IBM became a major manufacturer
instead of an assumbler and marketer. It became, the
world's largest producer of integrated circuitry. For
the first time the domestic product lire was identical
to that mar 1 '.-- ting in other countries through the World
Trade Organization. There have been three reorganizat-
ions actions s i'ice 1950, all contributing to the eleva-
tion of technically oriented managers in the corporation
hierarchy. And finally, IBM's consistently healthy cash
position was severely reduced because of the unprecedented
need Zo finance expansion.
^
Although this action was precedent-setting within
IBM, it is not unique to the industry. One of IBM'S: most
dynamic and successful competitors. Control Data Corpora-
tion has been concentrating on technology and engineering
since its inception in 1956. Primary developer of the
successful CDC 6600 and the world's largest computer, the
CDC 7600 is Seymour Cray, Senior Vice President at Control
Data, Aside from Chairman William i orris, he is probably





organization, ar.d is highly respected throughout .
computer field as a technician fin:- innovator,
IBiM's decision to market the System/ 360 has
broader implications than just the demands of building
and marketing the System. Information systems users
are becoming increasingly competent and discerning in
their use of equipment. They require less "hand-holding"
and more h 3 d rare efficiency. They are beco ' , more
concerned with costs and effective: ess . IBM is being
forced to respond with greater technical comp I nee in
product design, marketing, and ultimately, top level
management,
IBM management is changing. Specifically, it
is becoming more oriented toward technology and
engineering.
^"Control Data Tackles the Giant," p. 148.

VII. COINCLUSION
This research thesis has beer< an attempt to
' tracterize the top management of one of America's
most successful modern day industrial corporations.
Indicators of IBM's success have beer documented
statistically a id testimonially. Reasons for that
success have never been specifically determined, as
they are certainly many and interdependent.
There remains, however, an assumption in
business that whether a company : ' igly thrives
over a long period because of a healthy market, good
cash position, or good fortune, there must be sound
management or the other factors would have only
temporary effects. And so it is that by examining
top management characteristics, ore may gain valuable
insight into how a company operates and perhaps why
it is so successful.
The central question of this research is to
pinpoint the characteristics possessed by IBM top
management personnel that may contribute to IBM's




Subsidiary questions pu :'• : to suppo
the main question are: ride is tl of
IBM 'success ard what constitutes that success? What
doss the IBM organization st Look Like? What
are the hey executive p< ' Lc . :'/ that organization?
what are the general ch ' tics of the executives
occupying these po; ' Ions? What are the executive
characteristics of similar co i •; 6 why have
so.n b similarly sue uL hile others have not?
hat will be IBM's top cement reactions to c3
social attitudes?
In Chapter II, IBM's success was establish
using recent historical financial statistics from
within the company, and by comparison to top industrial
corporations according to Fortune . Also certain
textual comme its are quoted to show that IBM is highly
regarded in the industrial community as an example of
a successful and well > : [aged business organization.
The IBM organization is seen to be carefully
structured to clarify 1:' ss of communications and
authority. The marketing organization is highly
segregated accordi 3 to various markets served. The
emphasis on marketing is apparent in this organization
which is also broken down into product or service
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category. / executive positions ar?. , srally those
which bear the titles of president, vice president 01
director, a d extend from heads of staffs and operating
divisions up through chairman of the board. Board
directors who do not serve as company officers are not
i eluded
,
£xa dnation of other similar companies is also
useful as a comparative backdrop. Polaroid is similarly
characterized 1>3 t rapid technological grouch, perpetuation
of a small company atmosphere, heavy emphasis on market
a
and strong influence by one man, Sdwin Lend. Another
successful company, Xerox, who has not until recently,
become an IDmi co: igmtitor, is typical of the rapid growth,
marketing-oriented organization. Within IBM's marketplace
there are Control Data Corporation and Univac, Univac
provided a noteworthy example of the folly of technologi-
cal expertise at the expense of market penetration,
manage eat fragmentation, and complacency. Control Data,
on the other hand, is drawing ever closer to IBM in
appearance as it moves toward marketing while IBM moves
toward technology and engineering.
In analyzing IBM's top management characteristics
the principle standard is the Stanford University sponsored
study of 15 leading industrial companies. *• Several




conclusions are derived from the biographical data on
IBM's 43 top ex Cives:
IBM e: scutives are slightly yo tl the
Stanford e'.tvsv sample. They are equally, if not more
highly educated, with a higher percentage having more
than two college degrees. A notable segment of 13 i
executives received their advanced educations in well
established eastern institutions.
The greatest departure from the Stanford surv
sample in in the area of job exp rience. Most IBM top
executives have spent their entire careers with IBM
and in one functional area. formally that functional
area is marketing. This is in sharp contrast with the
survey which showed less functional specialization,
more experience with other firms and a disposition
toward the production function as a frequent path to
the top.
Upon further examination of recent events within
IBM, it is seen that marketing emphasis is giving way
to technological expertise. Also, because of 13K's
apparent vulnerability in the courts, it is becoming
well staffed with legal talent and reputation in the
persons of Burke Marshall, Nicholas de 3. Katzenbach




Other than tb prevailing attitude toward
marketing, it is evident that top IBM executives are
largely similar to those of other successful industrial
corporations. This is to bo e
_
cted in a mode;.
competitive environment. Beyond that, IBM executi\
are largely homogeneous in training and background,
leading to uniformity of purpose, beliefs, and goals.
In examining IBM's history, it is apparent that
a sense of morality, competitiv and image perp Cua-
tion have played strong roles in pursue IBM managers
to succeed. Tradition has also played an important role,
but the conventional hard traditions of Thomas J. '.atson
are now seen giving way to more flexible beliefs
conforming to the demands of soc5..ety.
Recruitment of the potential top managers of the
future is presenting a dilemma to IBM as well as other
business firms. IBM has not solved this problem, but
is taking measures to make itself socially responsive
and more attractive to the executives of tomorrow. And
because the way is not yet clear as to what society's
demands are to be, IBM is engaging today's young people
to promote better two-way understanding and appreciation.
In a closer look at IBM too management, it can be
seen that there remains an overriding concetitive spirit
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embodyi hard-hitting marketing tactics, a demand for
executive Loyalty, and a iarg- co ego. 1 IBM
President, T. V. Learson is de; ling of all his
subordinates and intolerant of dissention. 2 On tho
subject of corporate 030, Thomas Watson Jr. had said
that IBM always acted bigger, more sophisticated and
more successful than the balance sheet: showed. 3 This
is an expression of the original Watson evangelism.
Ironically, IBM has not: been an ig ;', first
to fully employ sophisticated comp I r systems for
coordination and management information because of its
desire to maintain the small company environment. It
now finds this measure necessary to hold the organization
together. Its management information system installed
^n 1967 is among the most advanced. \Jhether this will
at last destroy the atmosphere that IBM has sought to
perpetuate is still unknown. r
Many other problems are to confront IBM in the
future, but the attitude toward the future business
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environment is clear. Management positions on social
and business matters must not be stereotyped or they
will not be seriously regarded. Constructive and
reasonable alternatives must constantly be sought.
Thomas Watson, Jr. has stated that businesses
characteristically have shown less innovation to
public problems than to company problems. He further
says Chat this trend must be reversed in order to avoid
a double standard and conflict of interests.*
The same thesis has characterized IBM as a
company which has built noteworthy successes on
tradition, competitiveness, sense of morality and
cohesiveness. IBM's top executives of today were
schooled on these principles^ which are now being
challenged as means to successful ends.
IBM, however, has prided itself on educated
enlightenment and the ability to change. As long as
IBM's executives remain loyal to the beliefs expressed
by their Chairman, change will be a primary factor in
their corporate thought. Perpetuation of IBM's success
can only be brought about through additional enlightened
managers as time goes on.
The central questions regarding the effects of
1 Vat son, Jr. Beliefs. p. 99-106.
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IBM top n ajement characteristics on its pattern of
business success may be summarized as follows:
Strong traditions have instilled basic beliefs
in corporate executives which have provided strong
motivation and sense of direction. Because these
beliefs have 1 • si g, there has been unity of
effort. Subordinate to the basic beliefs, but in full
support thereof, are the characteristics of aggressive
marketing, advanced technology, corporate pride, sense
of fair play, search for young, dynamic leadership,
emphasis on intensive and continuing education, and
a keen awareness of the necessity to change with
corporate growth, competition, and social evolution.
The above executive characteristics are seen
to be of early origin within IB.: ana have withstood many
tests. It is likely that they are sound and will be
applied for some time to come, even, though individual
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